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INTRODUCTION
With great power comes great responsibility.
—Uncle Ben, Spider-Man1
Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
—Baron Acton2

The immense power of the prosecutor in the American
This is
criminal justice system cannot be overestimated.3
particularly so in a system of mandatory sentences and plea
bargains, which provides the prosecution with substantial
leverage against defendants.4 It is, therefore, distressing that
prosecutors are among the least accountable legal actors in the
criminal courtroom workgroup.5 A study conducted by the
1

SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures 2002).
Letter from Lord Action to Bishop Creighton (1887), in 1 LOUISE CREIGHTON,
LIFE AND LETTERS OF MANDELL CREIGHTON 372 ( 1904).
3
Kay Levine & Malcolm M. Feeley, Prosecution, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 12224, 12224 (Neil J.
Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001).
4
MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN
A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 156 (1992); Maximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining:
The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 224–25, 231 (2006); see Stuart S. Nagel, The
Tipped Scales of American Justice, in LAW AND ORDER: THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 47,
51 (Abraham Blumberg ed., 2d ed. 1973).
5
Andrea Elliott & Benjamin Weiser, When Prosecutors Err, Others Pay the
Price: Disciplinary Action Is Rare After Misconduct or Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 2004, at 25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/21/nyregion/when2
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Center for Public Integrity found more than 2000 cases of
prosecutorial misconduct that occurred between 1970 and 2003;
these cases have resulted in dismissed charges, reversed
convictions, and reduced sentences.6 Another study, conducted
by Chicago Tribune reporters, uncovered staggering rates of
conviction reversals due to prosecutorial misconduct.7 Such
instances of misconduct are distressing enough in themselves but
are made even worse in light of their contribution to perverse,
unjust trial outcomes.
While the emphasis in wrongful
conviction analysis has traditionally been on fault during the
investigative stage, such as eyewitness identification error,8 a
coerced false confession,9 and the use of a “jailhouse snitch[],”10
government misconduct by the police or the prosecution accounts
for as much as nineteen percent of wrongful convictions.11

prosecutors-err-others-pay-price-disciplinary-action-rare-after-misconduct.html. See
generally PETER F. NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978). The “workgroup” terminology comes
from Eisenstein and Jacob. JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE:
AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1991).
6
Elliott & Weiser, supra note 5.
7
Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice
Justice To Win: Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at N1; Ken
Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice To
Win: Prosecution on Trial in DuPage, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1999, at N1; Ken
Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice To
Win: Reversal of Fortune, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 1999, at N1; Ken Armstrong &
Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice To Win: The Flip
Side of a Fair Trial, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, at N1.
8
Eyewitness identification error was a factor in 53.5% of wrongful convictions
for capital crimes, making it the most ubiquitous error. Rob Warden, Exec. Dir., Ctr.
for Wrongful Convictions, Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, How Mistaken and Perjured
Eyewitness Identification Testimony Put 46 Innocent Americans on Death Row: An
Analysis of Wrongful Convictions Since Restoration of the Death Penalty Following
Furman v. Georgia (May 2, 2001), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
StudyCWC2001.pdf.
9
Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game,
30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 266, 270, 281–82 (1996); see also RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE
INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 196 (2008).
10
To the extent that some scholars say that this evidence should be
inadmissible in death penalty cases, see Rory K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary
Sources of Wrongful Convictions: Categorical Exclusion of Evidence in Capital
Statutes, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 965, 968, 971 (2008).
11
Warden, supra note 8.
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The Model Rules of Professional Conduct12 and the
guidelines for prosecutors in the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards13 provide very little in the way of guidance, beyond the
vague directive to “seek justice.”14 A substantial number of
prosecutors lose sight of the uniqueness of their position and the
ethical obligations it entails, suggesting that these vague
instructions are unhelpful.15
It is therefore imperative to
examine the reasons for misconduct and to construct
accountability structures that address them.
While in some cases these incidents of misconduct are due to
isolated malicious behavior, the literature on prosecutorial
misconduct increasingly regards it as a broader phenomenon
stemming from overzealousness and conviction-oriented “tunnel
vision.”16 “The ideal of the justice system,” writes Jocelyn
Pollock, “is that two advocates of equal ability will engage in a
pursuit of truth, guided by a neutral judge. The truth is supposed
to emerge from the contest.”17 The two advocates, however, do
not share the same duties. The prosecutor, while representing
the people or the government, has an ethical duty “to seek
justice, not merely to convict.”18 Therefore, while both sides may
suffer from biases regarding the strength of their cases, these
biases are more ethically problematic and have more severe
implications when they characterize prosecutorial offices.
This Article discusses the phenomenon of prosecutorial bias
and its possible causes, effects, and remedies, in the context of
Brady discovery violations. As an example of the ineffectiveness
of the existing legal approach to prosecutorial misconduct, the

12

See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (2011).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY § 31.2(c) (1993) (providing that “[t]he duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not
merely to convict”).
14
R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach
Us About a Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty To “Seek Justice”, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635,
636–37 (2006).
15
Robert Aronson & Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of High-Tech
Evidence by Prosecutors: Ethical and Evidentiary Issues, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453,
1453–56 (2007).
16
Id. at 1481.
17
JOYCELYN M. POLLOCK, ETHICAL DILEMMAS & DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 230 (7th ed. 2012).
18
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY § 31.2(c) (1993); see also Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26
FORD. URB. L.J. 607, 608, 612, 642 (1999).
13
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Article analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Connick
v. Thompson. In Connick, the Court denied the petitioner
compensation for eighteen years wrongfully spent in prison for a
murder and a robbery he did not commit, despite the fact that
the conviction stemmed from prosecutorial nondisclosure of
exculpatory evidence.19 The opinion of the Court, penned by
Justice Thomas, has been criticized for its insensitivity to
Thompson’s tragedy.20 This Article does not include a critique of
the decision’s tenor, nor does it delve into federal court procedure
technicalities. Rather, it criticizes the Court’s understanding of
prosecutorial intent and training from a social science
perspective.
The issue in Connick was whether the prosecution’s failure
to disclose exculpatory evidence—deliberate dishonesty on the
part of one prosecutor, aided by others in hiding his misdeed—
can amount to “deliberate indifference” on the part of the office
for training prosecutors in Brady violations.21 But, as this Article
argues, this debate misses the material point. Classifying a
prosecutorial misdeed as either an act of a malicious individual
or as the failure of an office to properly train its employees
creates a dichotomy between malice and good faith that fails to
address the fundamental problem, which is the existence of a
pervasive prosecutorial subculture that generates confirmation
biases, tunnel vision, and huge personal investment in a guilty
verdict. Using literature from the classic empirical courtroom
studies of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as recent cutting-edge
studies in cultural cognition, this Article shows how a
hyperadversarial system yields polarized organizational cultures,
which hinder the ability of prosecutors and defense attorneys to
see the other side’s perspective, and compromises not only the
quality of lawyering but also the fate of both defendants and
victims.
Ironically, by making prosecutors responsible for
discovery, the Court has placed responsibility for discovery in the

19
131 S. Ct. 1350, 1355–56 (2011) (finding a prosecutor’s office not liable to a
wrongfully convicted suspect who spent fourteen years on death row after it failed to
disclose exculpatory evidence at his trial). The case is discussed in detail in Part I.
20
Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel but Not Unusual: Clarence Thomas Writes One of the
Meanest Supreme Court Decisions Ever, SLATE (Apr. 1, 2011, 7:43 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2290036/ (arguing that the majority opinion shows empathy
only to the prosecution).
21
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1358–60.
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hands of those least likely to be able to perceive, interpret, and
assess the evidence’s exculpatory potential. Ultimately, neither
legal remedy—sending a message through conviction reversal or
inflicting punitive damages through a § 1983 verdict—is likely to
be effective in eradicating Brady violations.
Part I presents the problem through an analysis of the
opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia’s concurrence, and Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent. Part II shows the role played by causation
and culpability in framing the responsibility of prosecutors in
discovery proceedings. Part III discusses the implications of
discovery violations for § 1983 suits, in contrast to their role in
direct and collateral review of the conviction itself. Part IV
presents evidence from a solid body of literature in sociology and
political science, explaining why the debate misses the essential
understanding of how prosecutorial offices work. Part V tackles
the thorny issue of prosecutorial, police, and judicial intent in
constitutional violations, explaining why curbing § 1983 lawsuits
to a narrow definition of respondeat superior is an inadequate
solution for these violations. Part VI provides a series of
solutions and recommendations, in the spirit of toning down
hyperadversarialism: encouraging personnel transition between
prosecution and defense, putting people who have been on both
sides in charge of professional training, and reforming the law
school curriculum and bar exams to address the need to develop
the cognitive skill to see an issue from all perspectives, through
the use of persuasive memo writing and performance tests.
Finally, the epilogue provides an agenda for a future empirical
study on prosecutorial and defense perceptions of facts and case
strengths.
I.

A.

CONNICK V. THOMPSON: AN EXERCISE IN PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
The Facts

The respondent, John Thompson, brought a § 1983 lawsuit
against Connick, District Attorney of Orleans Parish in
Louisiana, for damages for eighteen years spent in prison,
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fourteen of them on death row, for two unrelated crimes, neither
of which he committed.22 The story behind this wrongful
conviction is tragic and infuriating.23
In 1984, Thompson was arrested for murder.24 Another man
arrested with him, as part of a plea bargain, agreed to testify
against Thompson in the murder trial. As a result of the
publicity following the murder charge, Thompson was identified
by victims of an unrelated armed robbery as their attacker.25
Thompson was charged with both offenses.26 The prosecution
decided to proceed with the burglary trial first, because a
conviction would rule out Thompson’s testimony in the murder
trial and would allow them to seek the death penalty.27 The
prosecutors did not disclose to the defense several important
pieces of exculpatory evidence, including impeachment testimony
and a blood sample taken from the crime scene.28 Thompson was
convicted of burglary and subsequently chose not to testify in his
murder trial,29 so as not to open the door to admission of the
burglary conviction. He was convicted for the murder30 too and,
due to the former conviction, sentenced to death.31
A month before Thompson’s scheduled execution, a miracle
occurred: A private investigator employed by the defense came
across the blood sample taken from the crime scene almost
twenty years before.32
The blood type did not match

22

Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355–56; John Thompson, Op. Ed., The Prosecution
Rests, but I Can’t, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2011, at WK11, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/10/opinion/10thompson.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1
&hp.
23
For an overview of the facts, see Nina Totenberg, Man Wrongly Convicted: Are
Prosecutors Liable?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 2, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/04/02/
135053529/man-wrongly-convicted-are-prosecutors-liable.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356.
27
Totenberg, supra note 23.
28
Id. It is important to note that the prosecutors did not know what Thompson’s
blood type was at the time. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356. This detail became
important later in the Supreme Court decision, but it also begs the undiscussed
question why the police did not seek to establish a match. While this paper
addresses prosecutorial, rather than police misconduct, hyperadversarialism might
partially explain this glaring omission as well.
29
Totenberg, supra note 23.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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Thompson’s.33 Thompson was retried, presented evidence that
another man committed the crimes,34 and was acquitted of all
charges.
Unbeknownst to Thompson at the time, several years before
the discovery—when he had already been on death row for
years—one of the prosecutors, diagnosed with a terminal illness,
revealed to another prosecutor that he had withheld the
exculpatory evidence.35 Now aware of the misdeed, no one else in
the prosecutor’s office did anything to bring this information to
light. After his exoneration, Thompson sued the prosecutor’s
office for damages under § 1983.36 Connick conceded that the
failure to disclose the blood sample was a Brady violation but
argued that the violation could not be attributed to the
municipality under § 1983 jurisprudence.37 The jury awarded
Thompson fourteen million dollars in damages—a million for
every year wrongfully spent on death row.38 A subsequent
appellate decision noted that the robbery conviction
unconstitutionally deprived Thompson of his right to testify in
his own defense and so causally linked the prosecutors’
misconduct in the burglary case to the conviction in the murder
case.39 The prosecutor’s office appealed the decision to the
Supreme Court.40 On March 29th, the Supreme Court reversed,
ruling in Connick’s favor.41

33

Id.
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1357. Note that the other man, who was dead by the
time of retrial, was the original arrestee who cut a deal with the prosecution and
provided evidence against Thompson. Accepting his word without a doubt as to his
objectivity, when he was initially arrested for the same crime, is another example of
the legal blindness caused by hyperadversarialism.
35
Lithwick, supra note 20.
36
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355.
37
Id. at 1357.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 1356–57. Note that this causality was not only foreseen; it was relied
upon by the prosecutors, who chose to proceed with the burglary trial first. The
fascinating issue of prosecutorial exploitation of multiple charges to manipulate the
defendant’s right to testify merits further research and exceeds the framework of
this paper.
40
Id. at 1356. Note that this causality was not only foreseen; it was relied upon
by the prosecutors, who chose to proceed with the burglary trial first. The
fascinating issue of prosecutorial exploitation of multiple charges to manipulate the
defendant’s right to testify merits further research and exceeds the framework of
this paper.
41
Id. at 1355–56.
34
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Deliberate Indifference or Individual Misstep?: Justice
Thomas’ Opinion

Justice Thomas announced the decision of the Court, stating
that under the doctrine exposing states to liability for
constitutional violations, the failure to disclose the evidence in
this case did not entitle Thompson to compensation.42
Under the policy of the District Attorney’s Office, wrote
Justice Thomas, prosecutors were to turn crime lab reports and
other scientific evidence over to the defense.43 Despite this fact,
and despite the prosecutors’ concession that failure to do so
constituted a Brady violation, Justice Thomas declared it was
unclear whether, not knowing Thompson’s blood type, the
prosecution should have regarded the perpetrator’s blood type as
exculpatory evidence requiring disclosure.44
Even assuming that a Brady violation occurred, wrote
Justice Thomas, government agencies are generally only
responsible under § 1983 for their own actions, not those of their
employees.45 In order to establish liability, a plaintiff has to
prove that the violation was not some personal mishap on the
part of one of the employees but rather the product of official
agency policy.46 In this case, Thompson tried to link the
activities of the particular group of prosecutors to the office policy
by arguing that Connick failed to train his staff in their discovery
obligations.47
The standard for proving a failure to train is very high. One
way of proving failure to train requires plaintiffs to marshal
impressive amounts of evidence, much of it regarding similar
errors, to show that the municipality or institution exhibited
“deliberate indifference” to the possibility of violation.48 In this
case, stated the Court, this burden was not met.49 Evidence of
similar Brady violations occurring in the same office is only
relevant when such violations were of the same nature and

42

Id. at 1366.
Id. at 1357.
44
Id. at 1357–58.
45
Id. at 1359.
46
Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); see also Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
47
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360–61.
48
Id. at 1360; City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822–23 (1985).
49
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1365.
43
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occurred before the violation in the plaintiff’s case.50 Some of the
violations Thompson presented occurred after he had already
been convicted.51 Others did not involve a failure to disclose
blood tests or scientific evidence specifically and therefore would
not put Connick on notice that further training was needed.52
The other path open to plaintiffs is based on City of Canton
v. Harris.53 In Canton, the Supreme Court stated that in some
cases the single constitutional violation would be so egregious
that it, in itself, could prove lack of training.54 The Canton
conditions, wrote Justice Thomas, were not met in Connick.55
Finally, the Court found no causality between lack of
training at the prosecutor’s office and the Brady violation.56 The
Court wrote that attorneys learn about Brady and discovery as
part of their law school education,57 even though in many
institutions criminal procedure is not a mandatory part of the
curriculum. Their studies for the bar exam and continuing legal
education requirements, to which they are subjected after
certification, are additional opportunities to learn about the
rules.58 Moreover, all attorneys are subject to a moral character
vetting before admission to the bar.59 At the District Attorney’s
50

Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1360 & n.7.
52
Id. at 1360.
53
489 U.S. 378 (1989).
54
Id. at 390 n.10 (1989) (stating the single-instance “Canton” hypothetical
identified by the majority opinion in Connick).
55
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361, 1363. The decision distinguishes between
training for police officers (the hypothetical posed in Canton, which would show a
city’s deliberate indifference to the “highly predictable consequence” that lack of
training would lead to constitutional violations) and training for attorneys. See id.
Ultimately, the high standard was not met. Id. at 1360, 1363–64.
56
Id. at 1363 (“In light of this regime of legal training and professional
responsibility, recurring constitutional violations are not the ‘obvious consequence’
of failing to provide prosecutors with formal in-house training about how to obey the
law.”) (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).
57
Id. at 1363 (stating that the Canton hypothetical assumes a complete lack of
knowledge on the part of police officers, and further stating that it is “undisputed
here that the prosecutors in Connick's office were familiar with the general Brady
rule”).
58
Id. at 1361. It is worthwhile to note that several states, including Connecticut
and Massachusetts, as well as the District of Columbia, do not require continuing
legal education for their attorneys. MCLE Information by Jurisdiction, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications_cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states.html (last
visited Oct. 28, 2013).
59
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1362 (citing LA. STATE BAR ASS’N ARTICLES OF INCORP.
Art. 14 § 7 (1988)). Moral character requirements usually pertain to convictions and
51
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office, newcomers are usually supervised by more experienced
attorneys, from whom they might learn how to handle discovery
requests and issues.60 In short, prosecutors, as opposed to police
officers, the malfeasors in Canton, have more exposure to the
general rules outlining their required conduct, which does away
with the need for specific training on the matter.61 Thus,
according to Justice Thomas, more training would not have
prevented the individual misdeed in Thompson’s case, and the
responsibility for his wrongful conviction did not lie with
Connick.
C.

Was This a Brady Violation?: Justice Scalia’s Concurrence

The concurring opinion went further than the majority in
denying the causality between the lack of training and the failure
to discover the evidence. According to Justice Scalia, the
question of whether there was a “pervasive culture of indifference
to Brady” was irrelevant;62 the only question before the Court
was whether “the need for training in constitutional
requirements is so obvious ex ante that the municipality’s failure
to provide that training amounts to deliberate indifference to
constitutional violations.”63 Brady violations, said Justice Scalia,
are inevitable;64 the nature of the violation here was highly
personal.
Deegan, the prosecutor at fault, confessed to
Riehlmann, “in the same conversation in which Deegan revealed
that he had only a few months to live[,] that he had ‘suppressed
blood evidence in the armed robbery trial of John Thompson that

history of fraud or misrepresentation. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY (2011). The majority supposedly suggests that this background
check might guarantee a lesser likelihood of fraud in practice.
60
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1362. “[I]n the Orleans Parish District Attorney's
Office, junior prosecutors were trained by senior prosecutors who supervised them as
they worked together to prepare cases for trial, and trial chiefs oversaw the
preparation of the cases. Senior attorneys also circulated court decisions and
instructional memoranda to keep the prosecutors abreast of relevant legal
developments.” Id.
61
Id. at 1363. “A licensed attorney making legal judgments, in his capacity as a
prosecutor, about Brady material simply does not present the same ‘highly
predictable’ constitutional danger as Canton's untrained officer.” Id.
62
Id. at 1366 (Scalia, J., concurring).
63
Id. (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989)).
64
Id. at 1367 (claiming that not only are Brady violations inevitable, but “[s]o
are all species of error routinely confronted by prosecutors”).
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in some way exculpated the defendant.’ ”65 In turn, Riehlmann
kept quiet about the violation for five years.66 This, said Justice
Scalia, was a “good-faith nondisclosure of a blood report not
known to be exculpatory,” which no amount of training would
prevent.67
Because Riehlmann’s failure to come forward was an error
made in good faith, said Justice Scalia, Thompson’s case could
not be distinguished from the result in Arizona v. Youngblood.68
In Youngblood, which dealt with destruction of potentially
exculpatory evidence,69 the Court held that destruction of
evidence only constituted a violation when done in bad faith.70
With regard to good-faith violations, the rule is the same for
nondisclosure and destruction.71 Justice Scalia speculated,
Perhaps one day we will recognize a distinction between goodfaith failures to preserve from destruction evidence whose
inculpatory or exculpatory character is unknown, and good-faith
failures to turn such evidence over to the defense. But until we
do so, a failure to train prosecutors to observe that distinction
cannot constitute deliberate indifference.72

Justice Scalia finished his opinion “revealing” what he
referred to as the “best-kept secret of this case,” which was that
“[t]here was probably no Brady violation at all—except for
Deegan’s (which, since it was a bad-faith, knowing violation,
could not possibly be attributed to lack of training).”73 Anyone
else’s shortcomings, which were supposedly not in bad faith, did
not trigger a duty to train, and therefore did not generate
liability on Connick’s part.74

65

Id. at 1368.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 1369 (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)).
69
In Youngblood, the evidence would have undoubtedly been exculpatory;
Youngblood was exonerated in 2000 from his 1985 conviction. Arizona Exonerated,
ARIZONA INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.arizonainnocenceproject.org/AzIP_4/
Exon.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
70
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.
71
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1369.
72
Id.
73
Id. The smug tone of this assertion has triggered indignant critique. See, e.g.,
Lithwick, supra note 20.
74
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1369–70.
66

FINAL_AVIRAM

2013]

12/10/2013 4:08 PM

HYPERADVERSARIALISM

13

D. Systemic Disregard?: Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent
The essence of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent was that
Thompson had met the burden of proof required by Canton: The
evidence showed systemic flaws in the administration of
discovery and compliance with Brady standards that could be
prevented through appropriate training. According to Justice
Ginsburg, the evidence established “that misperception and
disregard of Brady’s disclosure requirements were pervasive in
Orleans Parish.”75 While this was demonstrated as a general
trend within the office, the incident itself had such obvious
markings of flagrant disregard of Brady duties that it satisfied
the Canton requirements.76 Several prosecutors disregarded
Thompson’s Brady rights.77 This disregard stemmed from a
general animus and zeal-feeding prosecutorial policy in this
case.78 Thompson’s conviction might explain this disregard: The
prosecution made a strategic choice to file the robbery charges
first, so that Thompson would not testify at his murder trial and
would have a conviction on record to present at the death penalty
phase.79 Justice Ginsburg further pointed out that the case was
not an example of a single isolated violation.80 Beyond the blood
evidence incident, there were other examples of Brady violations
in the trial: The defense was not offered potential impeachment
evidence,81 nor was it made aware that the eyewitness
description in the original police report did not match
Thompson.82
Under these circumstances, argued Justice Ginsburg, “[t]he
prosecutorial concealment Thompson encountered . . . is bound to
be repeated unless municipal agencies bear responsibility . . . for

75

Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1377.
77
Id. at 1370.
78
For an example of the animus characterizing prosecutorial policy in this case,
see id. at 1373 n.7 (citing the trial transcript that states, “During jury deliberations
in the armed robbery case, Williams, the only Orleans Parish trial attorney common
to the two prosecutions, told Thompson of his objective in no uncertain terms: ‘I’m
going to fry you. You will die in the electric chair.’ ”).
79
Id. at 1373 n.8.
80
Id. at 1370.
81
Id. at 1374.
82
Id. (“Failure to produce the police reports setting out what the eyewitness
first said . . . left defense counsel without knowledge that the prosecutors were
restyling the killer's ‘close cut hair’ into an ‘Afro.’ ”).
76
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adequately conveying what Brady requires and for monitoring
staff compliance.”83 The majority’s position was particularly
problematic because the office prosecutors had come “fresh out of
law school”84 and their manual did not include a comment about
impeachment evidence.85
This set of factors, wrote Justice Ginsburg, satisfied the
requirements set in Canton: There was a certainty that the
prosecutors would confront the situation; the situation involved a
difficult choice or one where there had been a history of
mishandling; and, as actually occurred in this case, the wrong
choice would frequently cause a deprivation of rights.86
II. BRADY AND DISCOVERY
A.

Discovery and Adversarialism

The discovery obligation is a relatively new trend in the
common law adversarial system.87 Its very nature conflicts with
the concept of the trial as a “contest” between two teams, with
the judiciary and jury playing only a secondary part;88 revealing
one’s information entails relinquishing the advantage of
surprise.89 It is no wonder, therefore, that its scope has been

83

Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1379 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85
Id. at 1381 (noting that “the manual did not acknowledge what Giglio v.
United States made plain: Impeachment evidence is Brady material prosecutors are
obligated to disclose” (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (citation
omitted))).
86
Id. at 1382 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 & n.10 (1989)).
87
Steven M. Smoot, Discovery in Texas Criminal Cases: How Far Have We
Come?, 8 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 91 (1980). As Smoot points out, the concept of “trial by
surprise” was common in the criminal justice world as recently as maybe thirty
years ago; since then, reforms have pretty much eliminated trial by surprise in favor
of extensive pretrial wrangling.
88
Of course, this ideal has not been fully preserved in reality. See William B.
Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 371–72
(2001). But some argue that in the criminal justice system it is more of a contest on
behalf of the defense. The prominence of plea bargains in the system should not be
seen as a fault in this model; as some argue, plea bargains are the logical conclusion
of the adversarial process. See generally Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and
the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYS. J. 338, 340 (1982) (explaining
several of the values unique to the adversarial system).
89
Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 228, 249 (1964); see also Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in
Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 19 (1995).
84
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under debate in the United States and in a number of other
jurisdictions,90 in which scholars and practitioners have
presented arguments about the nature of the system. Discovery
is an important, albeit not the only, method for providing
information on the case early on,91 allowing the parties to narrow
the focus of trial when applicable. However, in a system based
primarily on plea-bargaining, it becomes particularly important,
in that it allows the parties more control over assessing the value
of the case and therefore may ease negotiations based on more
information.92
Discovery is particularly important in
determinate sentencing cases, because minute factual details
may make a difference regarding the classification for sentencing
purposes and will often be negotiated by the parties in the
context of a plea.93
The trend in state law, in general, has been toward an
expansion of discovery rights; federal law has lagged behind the
states in promoting pretrial discovery.94 Under most state law,
the prosecution and the defense must, at a minimum, share their
lists of witnesses with each other prior to trial.95 While this
obligation pertains to both parties, it is particularly crucial that
the prosecution, acting as an “officer of the court,” comply with
it.96 Another important trend, also influenced by the prevalence
90
In Canada, for example, one of the prosecutors interviewed by James Wilkins
has critiqued the imbalance between prosecution and defense duties to disclose,
arguing that the defense should be required to disclose as much evidence as the
prosecution. James L. Wilkins, Discovery, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 355, 371–72 (1975–76).
91
Timothy B. Heavner, Leaving No Stone Unturned: Alternative Methods of
Discovery in Capital Cases, 7 CAP. DEF. DIG. 38, 38, 40 (1995) (suggesting the use of
a subpoena duces tecum or the Freedom of Information Act).
92
Debra S. Emmelman, Trial by Plea Bargain: Case Settlement as a Product of
Recursive Decisionmaking, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 335, 345 (1996).
93
Stephen H. Glickman & Steven M. Salky, Rediscovering Discovery: It’s Time
To Overhaul the Rules To Ensure Fair Treatment for Defendants in Federal Cases, 4
CRIM. JUST. 12, 14–15 (1989). Even in systems in which sentencing is less
determinate and sentencing factors are listed in a statute, discovery of facts may be
crucial.
94
Id. at 14.
95
JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PROSECUTING CRIME 880–81 (4th ed. 2010).
96
Tamara L. Graham, Death by Ambush: A Plea for Discovery of Evidence in
Aggravation, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 321, 331 (2005). The symmetry between prosecution
and defense is not the same in all states, and several countries, such as Israel and
the UK, require almost unilateral discovery on the part of the prosecution, whereas
most of the defense’s plan can be a surprise. M. Shalgi, Note, Criminal Discovery in
Israel, 4 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 155, 158 (1966). Nonetheless, in almost all countries, there
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of plea bargaining, has been an increasing informality in the
discovery process, which in many settings is handled by direct
communication between the parties, often without a specific
request and without judicial intervention.97
B.

Subverting Adversarialism: Discovery of Exculpatory
Evidence

Brady v. Maryland’s mandate that the prosecution disclose
exculpatory evidence98 is built upon previous decisions about
prosecutorial mishandling of evidence. In Mooney v. Holohan,99
the Supreme Court pronounced a rule against presenting
perjured evidence;100 Brady extended this rule from prohibiting
false evidence to prohibiting the omission of exculpatory
evidence.101 Echoing two Third Circuit Court decisions,102 the
Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”103
For the purpose of discussing adversarialism and
prosecutorial responsibilities, it is important to make two
observations about Brady. First, Brady explicitly rejects any
requirement to prove mens rea on the part of the prosecutor.104
Whether or not the lack of disclosure was due to bad faith, it is
enough that the evidence was material to either guilt or
sentence.105 This is a harm-oriented, rather than an intent-

is one piece of information that defendants must disclose: an alibi defense. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85 (1970) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does
not entitle a defendant in a criminal trial to refuse to disclose his alibi).
97
Practices in this regard vary widely between states and even between
prosecutorial offices. Wm. Bradford Middlekauff, What Practitioners Say About
Broad Criminal Discovery Practice, 9 CRIM. JUST. 14, 16, 55–58 (1994).
98
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
99
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
100
Id. at 112.
101
Brady, 373 U.S. at 86.
102
See id. (citing United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir.
1952) and United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955)).
103
Id. at 87. It is important to point out that, while some of the leading cases on
Brady violations focused on evidence that went to the question of guilt, evidence
useful for punishment mitigation is also “exculpatory evidence.”
104
Id.
105
Id.
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oriented, rule.106 Second, and more importantly, the power of
Brady is in its profound challenge of the adversarial “contest”
model. The rule makes an important statement about the duties
the prosecution owes to the defendant and to the interest of
justice. Beyond refraining from making biased comments107 or
creating biased jury panels,108 a rule requiring disclosure places
an affirmative duty on the prosecution to help the defense make
its case. Evidence collected by the police for the purpose of
securing a conviction must be placed in the hands of the defense,
even though—or in fact, because—it might secure acquittal.109
C.

Responsibility for Discovery: The Agurs-Bagley Debate

The revolutionary nature of the Brady rule, and
complications resulting from its breadth and vagueness, required
some elucidation in subsequent years. In United States v.

106
Based on causality rather than intent, this rule is similar to other criminal
procedure rules, such as bail. It is different, however, from the rules about jury
selection that have required intent. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
In Batson, the Court held that a defendant may show violation of his or her right to
a jury venire drawn from a cross-section of the community only by a showing of
purposeful racial discrimination by the prosecutor. Id. The defendant must show
that, in his or her jury selection, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to
exclude members of the defendant’s “cognizable racial group” and must show such
circumstances that “raise an inference that the prosecutor used [peremptory
challenges] to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.” Id.
Later decisions expanded the grounds for a Batson challenge, but the test and intent
required remained the same. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991)
(expanding Batson to cases which did not involve claimants and jurors of the same
race but maintained the purposeful requirement of the discrimination). This leaves
without remedy those who are harmed based on their race or other cognizable
characteristic but who cannot show intent. Scholars examining implicit bias have
argued compellingly that unconsciously held negative views about race affect our
actions but cannot be shown to constitute intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Jerry
Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
“Affirmative Action”, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1076 n.69 (2006).
107
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) (holding that the right to
be free of negative inferences based on a failure to testify extends to the sentencing
stage in federal trials); Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981) (holding that
defendants are entitled to have the jury instructed that no inference may be drawn
from a defendant’s refusal to testify); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)
(holding that a prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s failure to testify violated the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment).
108
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
109
See, e.g., Note, The Prosecutor’s Duty To Disclose to Defendants Pleading
Guilty, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1005 (1986).
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Agurs,110 the prosecution failed to disclose the victim’s previous
convictions for violent crime, which would have supported a selfdefense argument.111 Justice Stevens discerned three situations.
First was prosecutorial reliance on perjured testimony, in which
case the standard for setting aside the verdict depends on
applying a “strict standard of materiality.”112
Second,
nondisclosure in reply to a request for specific evidence also
requires a test of materiality upon appeal.113 Agurs presented a
third situation. In Agurs, the defense made no specific request
for information.114 Rather, as became practice among defense
attorneys at the time, there was a general request for Brady
materials. This, the Court stated, presented a difficulty:
In many cases . . . , exculpatory information in the possession of
the prosecutor may be unknown to defense counsel. In such a
situation he may make no request at all, or possibly ask for “all
Brady material” or for “anything exculpatory.” Such a request
really gives the prosecutor no better notice than if no request is
made. If there is a duty to respond to a general request of that
kind, it must derive from the obviously exculpatory character of
certain evidence in the hands of the prosecutor. But if the
evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it
gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty
should equally arise even if no request is made. Whether we
focus on the desirability of a precise definition of the
prosecutor’s duty or on the potential harm to the defendant, we
conclude that there is no significant difference between cases in
which there has been merely a general request for exculpatory
matter and cases, like the one we must now decide, in which
there has been no request at all.115

The Court in Agurs was therefore clearly trying to prevent
abuse of Brady by the defense. The difficulty is one that has to
do with the burden placed upon the prosecutor. The more
interesting aspect of Agurs is that the limitation upon the
prosecutor seems to be one of perception. In other words, what
concerned Justice Stevens was that prosecutors would be
required to look for the evidence not only for the defense attorney
110
111
112
113
114
115

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
Id. at 100–01.
Id. at 103–04.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 102 n.4.
Id. at 106–07.
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but also with the eyes of a defense attorney, which went beyond
what he considered a reasonable expectation. Agurs, therefore,
distinguishes between material evidence and evidence that has
an “obviously exculpatory character.”116 The latter category
includes crucial evidence, but that standard may be relaxed in
the case of a verdict that “is already of questionable validity.”117
This two-tier system concept was short lived, and the Court
abolished it in United States v. Bagley.118 In Bagley, the defense
requested information regarding whether undercover agents
serving as witnesses for the prosecution had been compensated
for their testimony against the defendant.119 Despite the fact
that they had indeed been compensated, the prosecutor failed to
disclose this fact, preventing the defendant from using the
information as valuable impeachment evidence.120 Rejecting the
two-tier system adopted in Agurs, Justice Blackmun found that a
single causation test would suffice to cover all eventualities.121
Regardless of whether there was a general request, a specific
request, or no request at all, the defendant is entitled to a
remedy only in material cases—that is, “only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”122
Bagley’s impact on state law was underwhelming. New
York, for example, explicitly rejected its materiality test and
retained the Agurs two-tier standard.123
Post-Bagley, no
In
jurisdiction reduced the scope of pretrial discovery.124
addition, the Rules of Professional Conduct for prosecutors
continued to advocate a broad Brady standard of disclosure even
absent a request from the defense, requiring the prosecution to
disclose without request “[a]ny material or information within

116

Id. at 107, 109–11.
Id. at 113.
118
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
119
Id. at 669–70.
120
Id. at 670–72.
121
Id. at 682.
122
Id..
123
People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 77–78, 555 N.E.2d 915, 920–21, 556 N.Y.S.2d
518, 523–24 (1990).
124
Cary Clennon, Pre-Trial Discovery of Witness Lists: A Modest Proposal To
Improve the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Superior Court of the District
of Columbia, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 641, 657 (1989).
117
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the prosecutor’s possession or control which tends to negate the
guilt of the defendant as to the offense charged or which would
tend to reduce the punishment of the defendant.”125
Moreover, informal practices of broad discovery remained the
norm in various locales. In a survey of practitioners, it was
reported that only a quarter of all cases entailed any judicial
involvement in the discovery process, and many defense
attorneys reported receiving more discovery than required by
state law,126 though this tendency was reported by some to be
more common among “rookie” prosecutors127 or when the
prosecution had a strong case and wanted to encourage a plea
bargain.128
Despite declining constitutional protections,
therefore, the practicalities of the workday have yielded and
maintained a de facto broader discovery norm than required by
Supreme Court case law.
D. When Bad Faith Matters: Destruction of Evidence and
Youngblood
As mentioned above, prosecutorial mens rea, or bad faith,
was deemed unimportant when assessing the need to disclose
exculpatory evidence.129 However, the Court established an
intent-based rule with regard to the destruction of potentially
In Arizona v. Youngblood, the
exculpatory evidence.130
prosecution lost samples of a sexual assault kit, leading to
Youngblood’s conviction for child molestation.131 Had the court
employed the guilt-free prejudice test from the Brady-Bagley line
of cases, the sample analysis might have completely exonerated
Youngblood, who, as it turned out, was indeed exonerated in
2000.132 Rather than adopting an outcome-oriented test as in
Agurs or Bagley, the Supreme Court reasoned, “[o]ur decisions in
related areas have stressed the importance for constitutional
125
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY
§ 11-2.1 (3d ed. 1996).
126
Middlekauff, supra note 97, at 17.
127
Id. at 17.
128
Id. It may well be that wholesale disclosure, especially in the digital age,
could hide exculpatory evidence in a forest of marginally relevant “trees.”
129
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
130
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
131
Id. at 54.
132
Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood: Due Process, Lost
Evidence, and the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 241, 243–44 (2008).
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purposes of good or bad faith on the part of the Government
when the claim is based on loss of evidence attributable to the
Government.”133 Expressing concern about obliging the police to
preserve evidence indefinitely, the Supreme Court refused to find
a due process violation where the destruction could “at worst be
described as negligent.”134
As with Bagley, the impact of Youngblood was rather
limited.135 While a few states—California,136 Arizona,137 Maine,
and Ohio138—adopted a “bad faith” standard for destruction of
evidence, most states deviated from this precedent, making bad
faith immaterial for finding due process violations.139 Later
developments further eroded the Youngblood doctrine. The
exculpatory and incriminatory potential of DNA evidence has
dramatically increased, as has public awareness to the
importance of such evidence.140
Increasing numbers of
exonerations have propelled forty-three states, the District of
Columbia, and the federal government, to create legislation
allowing for post-conviction DNA testing under certain
circumstances, and, perhaps as a consequence, seventeen states,
the District of Columbia, and the federal government now impose
a “blanket” duty to preserve evidence.141 Norman Bay attributes
these developments to a preference for fairness over
instrumental “education” of prosecutors.142

133

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57.
Id. at 58.
135
Daniel R. Dinger, Should Lost Evidence Mean a Lost Chance To Prosecute?:
State Rejections of the United States Supreme Court Decision in Arizona v.
Youngblood, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 329, 333–34 (2000) (noting Youngblood’s argument
on appeal that testing the destroyed evidence could have conclusively proved the
identity of the true assailant, thus exonerating him); see also Youngblood, 488 U.S.
at 54–55.
136
Dinger, supra note 135, at 343–44.
137
Id. at 344–46.
138
Id. at 346–47.
139
Id. at 356.
140
Bay, supra note 132, at 279–80.
141
Id. at 284.
142
Id. at 287.
134
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III. INTERLUDE: DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF
§ 1983 LAWSUITS
A survey of discovery law reveals a complicated set of
expectations from prosecutors. In general, the prosecution’s
monopoly over police-collected evidence has imposed a fiduciary
duty of sorts to disclose exculpatory evidence in its hands to the
defense.143 Post-Brady case law and legislation has focused on
defining the extent to which it is fair to require prosecutors’
compliance with this duty.
The applicable case law and
legislation feature two distinct schools of thought on the
circumstances that should trigger mandatory discovery.
Causation, exemplified by the Agurs-Bagley-Vilardi debate, turns
on how material a piece of evidence must be in order for its
nondisclosure to be an issue requiring remedy.144 Culpability was
the pivotal issue in Agurs and Youngblood.145 Agurs emphasized
the excessive burden of combing a case looking for evidence not
specifically requested, and Youngblood limited prosecutorial
liability by imposing a bad faith standard.146 These divergent
standards reflect a broader debate over whether the role of
remedies for constitutional violations is to right wrongs for the
particular defendant or teach law enforcement authorities a
lesson. The post-Warren Courts have moved away from the
practice of creating constitutional rules for deterrence purposes
and toward more vague outcome-oriented, totality-of-thecircumstances tests.147 In the discovery context, this trend
explains why discovery violations are acknowledged only to the
extent that they materially contributed to the conviction, and
also why the Court may be skeptical about deterring
prosecutorial behavior in evidence destruction cases that did not

143

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963).
See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111–12 (1976).
145
See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110.
146
See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110; see also Bay, supra
note 132, at 284, 302–06 (analyzing the interplay of these two ideas in the postYoungblood legislation and litigation).
147
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 6–7 (5th ed. 2007); Peter
Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 247 (1983); Hadar Aviram & Daniel
L. Portman, Inequitable Enforcement: Introducing the Concept of Equity into
Constitutional Review of Law Enforcement, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 413, 422 (2009).
144
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involve bad faith.148 What it does not explain is the distinction
between the outcome-oriented standard in nondisclosure cases
and the intent-oriented standard in destruction cases.149
In Connick v. Thompson, prosecutorial discovery misconduct
was discussed in a different procedural context than the above
cases. Having already been exonerated, Thompson did not sue to
seek a reversal of his conviction, but rather to seek financial
redress by placing responsibility upon the shoulders of his
wrongdoers.150
On one hand, the two proceedings are
fundamentally different. In the § 1983 context, focus is shifted
away from the outcome of the criminal trial, which has already
been resolved, and toward the law enforcement agency itself.
Thompson’s New York Times op-ed, criticizing the Supreme
Court’s decision, ended with the words, “A crime was definitely
committed in this case, but not by me.”151 The lawsuit, therefore,
could be perceived as the trial of the wrongdoers, and therefore
needs to probe deeper into their culpability. On the other hand, a
broader understanding of wrongful convictions suggests that
seeking financial compensation for years wrongfully spent in
prison could, and perhaps, should be seen as an integral part of
the “remedy package,” rather than as a deterrent or educational
device. Also, the comparison between the two proceedings raises
the question of efficiency—that is, which of the two proceedings
is more likely to ensure prosecutorial compliance and ethical
behavior in the future? While some see reversals and overturned
convictions as powerful tools of deterrence,152 this may be simply
148
Cf. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009) (holding that where
“the error was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest[,] . . . the
jury should not be barred from considering all the evidence”); see also Hadar Aviram
et al., Moving Targets: Placing the Good Faith Doctrine in the Context of Fragmented
Policing, 37 FORD. URB. L.J. 709, 712 (2010).
149
In Thompson, Scalia expressed at least an open mind to the possibility that
the two standards should converge. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1369
(2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Perhaps one day we will recognize a distinction
between good-faith failures to preserve from destruction evidence whose inculpatory
or exculpatory character is unknown, and good-faith failures to turn such evidence
over to the defense.”).
150
Id. at 1355 (majority opinion).
151
Thompson, supra note 22, at 2.
152
This is comparable to the Fourth Amendment debate on the effectiveness of
the exclusionary rule versus other compliance-inducing mechanisms, and some have
suggested that the exclusionary rule (a within-trial remedy) has proven the best
deterrent technique. SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF
DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–1990, at 49–50 (1993) (citing the
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due to their availability. More criminal defendants will appeal
their convictions than sue under § 1983. On the other hand,
remedies under § 1983 are available to address government
wrongdoing beyond the confines of the criminal process, to people
who were never convicted or even tried.
The common issue underlying all of these considerations is
one that is rarely explored in case law: Whether, generally
speaking, prosecutorial practice is conducive to developing the
skills to spot exculpatory evidence, let alone to assess its
strength.
Prosecutorial misconduct allegations are not
uncommon. For example,
[t]he Center for Public Integrity cited nearly six-hundred Texas
appeals from 1970 until 2003 where defendant raised
allegations of prosecutor misconduct. . . . In 152 of those cases, a
court held the prosecutor’s conduct prejudiced the defendant,
resulting in a reversal and a remand of the conviction, sentence
or indictment. Five of these defendants later proved their
innocence.153

Examining discovery violations as examples of the broader
phenomenon of prosecutorial misconduct, rather than on a caseby-case basis, reveals the narrowness and inadequacy of both
intent-oriented and outcome-oriented regimes.
If discovery
violations stem from the experience of prosecutorial practice,
individual malice or lack thereof becomes irrelevant to the
outcome. The individual prosecutor should pay a professional
price for her malice, but this malice is actually the product of a
fertile organizational Petri dish. If inattention to, and disregard
for, the possibility of innocence is a broad organizational
phenomenon, the cases in which convictions are overturned, and
the fewer cases in which exonerations occur, are merely a
window into a more general culture of indifference. The next
Part uses insights from both surveys of prosecutors and cultural
cognition studies to demonstrate the existence of such a culture,

exclusionary rule as contributing to significant reforms in the practice of law
enforcement and criminal procedure in, for example, Chicago). For a colossal
misunderstanding of this argument’s implications, see generally Scalia’s opinion in
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 587–602 (2006).
153
Kelly Gier, Note, Prosecuting Injustice: Consequences of Misconduct, 33 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 191, 193 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
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and as a consequence, to suggest that the legal framing of
prosecutorial misconduct through the lenses of either causation
or culpability is overly narrow and inadequate.
IV. LEGAL BLINDNESS: WHY PROSECUTORS DO NOT SEE
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
A.

The Prosecutorial Organizational Culture

The reasons for prosecutorial misconduct are complex, and
analyzing those reasons depends on the focus of one’s lens. From
an ethical perspective, prosecutorial behavior is a reflection of
the individual prosecutor’s set of values and commitment to
justice; as Michael Cassidy argues, various legally nebulous
dilemmas faced by prosecutors can be solved through an appeal
to personal virtues.154 For example, the dilemma over whether to
enter into a plea bargain with a turncoat accomplice155 implicates
virtues of courage and honesty.156 Others, while acknowledging
the important role of office culture in generating a sense of office
ethics, still regard ethics as an individual virtue. In a candid
insider’s piece, Patrick Fitzgerald mentions the importance of
hiring ethical candidates because such candidates are less likely
to be corrupted in an environment of faulty ethics.157 He also
emphasized the importance of good supervisors in creating an
ethical environment.158 “Management has to have confidence
that when they find that piece of Brady material on a Saturday
afternoon, they will turn it over. If you do not have that
confidence, you must take action.”159 However, as compared with
other flaws or challenges an attorney may overcome, “when the
issue is credibility and ethics, then that is something you cannot
work with. A person either has it or does not, and ethics is an
area where an office cannot compromise or bend.”160

154

Cassidy, supra note 14, at 660, 693.
Id. at 654.
156
Id. at 660–61.
157
Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Thoughts on the Ethical Culture of a Prosecutor’s
Office, 84 WASH. L. REV. 11, 13–15, 17–18 (2009). Fitzgerald’s Article emphasizes
that hiring ethical attorneys is one of a supervising attorney’s many obligations in
establishing an ethical office. Id.
158
Id. at 20.
159
Id. at 21.
160
Id. at 22.
155
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Other commentators, however, attribute prosecutorial
misconduct to the broader set of social and organizational
circumstances underlying their work. Peter Joy ascribes it to the
broader prosecutorial work environment, arguing that the fact
that head prosecutors are elected creates pressure to maintain a
“tough on crime” image to appeal to the public.161
But even without the broader political context, there are
workday-related variables that affect the quality of prosecutorial
behavior. Criminal courtroom ethnographers have consistently
argued that the realities of the criminal process create strong
incentives to overcharge and to bargain. In 1964, Herbert Packer
posited two models of the criminal process: a crime control model,
emphasizing efficiency and a strong reliance on the investigative
phase, and a due process model, emphasizing concern about
wrongful conviction and providing constitutional safeguards
limiting police and prosecutorial discretion.162 Packer’s models
reflected his impression of the constitutional revolution of the
1960s, spearheaded by the Warren Court. This revolution was
characterized by a series of decisions incorporating the criminal
justice provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment and thus applying them to the states. Although the
trend was largely reversed in later years, some of its effects, as
well as its symbolic import, remained.163 Some of these decisions
created limitations on prosecutorial discretion164 and behavior in
Social
the courtroom,165 as well as during bargaining.166

161
Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
399, 405.
162
HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). For more
about the models, see generally Hadar Aviram, Packer in Context: Formalism and
Fairness in the Due Process Model, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 237 (2011); Stuart
Macdonald, Constructing a Framework for Criminal Justice Research: Learning from
Packer’s Mistakes, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 257 (2008); Kent Roach, Four Models of the
Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671 (1999).
163
Arenella, supra note 147, at 185. Packer later grew disillusioned with the
post-Warren Court decisions, expressing disappointment with due process at the end
of his life. Aviram, supra note 162, at 244 n.1.
164
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974) (“A person convicted of an offense
is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that
the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one,
thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration.”).
165
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
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scientists, however, had less faith in the Warren Court decisions’
potential to reform the criminal process. Reviewing Packer’s
book in 1969, Abraham Blumberg observed that the models hid a
reality that was closer to the crime control model: a system
guided mostly by efficiency and plea-bargaining, more visible in
the world of assembly-line cases in lower courts than in the
echelons of the Supreme Court.167 Even more incisive was
Malcolm Feeley’s observation that the two models were in fact
made of the same fabric.168 Due process, Feeley argued, was a
normative, idealized concept generated by the Warren Court’s
constitutional rulings, masking the empirical reality, which was
actually much closer to Packer’s crime control model.169 Doreen
McBarnet pushed this angle further by arguing that the veneer
of due process exists for the purpose of securing convictions
under the guise of legitimacy, and therefore “due process is for
crime control.”170 These critics suggested that the contrast
between the models was false.171 The image of the criminal trial
as gleaned from Supreme Court decisions of the 1960s consisted
of normative edicts to adhere to bright-line rules in police
procedure and refrain from unchecked discretion. This set of
bright-line rules was subsequently eroded by the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts, in decisions that granted police officers and
prosecutors more leeway and expressed more trust in their
professional judgment.172 Even at its height, the due process
model did not trickle down to police stations and lower courts,
166
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in
any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled”).
167
Abraham S. Blumberg, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 790, 791 (1969)
(reviewing HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968)).
168
FEELEY, supra note 4, at 25–28 (discussing the commonalities between the
two traditional models); see also Malcolm M. Feeley, Pleading Guilty in Lower
Courts, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461, 462–63 (1979) (stating that “[d]iscussions of plea
bargaining often conjure up images of a Middle Eastern bazaar” involving haggling
over each case, when in fact such negotiations “are more akin to modern
supermarkets,” in which there is a “going rate” for each offense). The charade serves
to convince defendants of their attorney’s efforts on their behalf and to mollify them
to accept a “deal” rather than going through the expense and humiliation of a trial
certain to end in conviction. Id. at 464–65.
169
See FEELEY, supra note 4 at 26–27.
170
DOREEN J. MCBARNET, CONVICTION 156 (1981).
171
Id.; see also FEELEY, supra note 4, at 25–28; Blumberg, supra note 167
(critiquing Packer’s findings on the basis of several social science studies).
172
Arenella, supra note 147, at 192–93.
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where police maneuvering and plea bargains proliferated. Police
officers relied on race and class for profiling purposes, and a
culture of lies permeated the system.173 Interrogations designed
to circumvent Miranda and other safeguards yielded waivers of
the right to silence, and the court’s reliance on the resulting
confessions as probative evidence created a disincentive to seek
other types of evidence.174 More pertinent to the topic of this
Article is the fact that prosecutors operate in a system in which
more than ninety percent of all cases are disposed via plea
bargains.175 In this system, prosecutors overcharge and establish
a sentencing “menu” for particular crimes to promote early plea
bargaining.176 In short, much of the character of modern criminal
justice, including prosecutorial behavior and decisionmaking,
was established by the organizational culture of the police station
and the courtroom, rather than by any form of malicious design
on the part of a few interested parties.
An important part of this organizational culture lies in what
Packer referred to as the “presumption of guilt.”177 Rather than
being an evidentiary counterbalance to the presumption of
innocence, the presumption of guilt is a statement of statistical
confidence. Under this paradigm, law enforcement personnel,
prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys assume that anyone
whose case passes through police investigation and a
prosecutorial decision on charging has a high probability of being
guilty of the offense of which he or she is accused.178 If the
process provides the police and prosecution with adequate power
and discretion, it may dispense with formalities and safeguards

173
JERRY H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 73–76, 230–31 (4th ed., 2011).
174
Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, supra
note 9, at 284.
175
Douglas Savitsky, The Problem with Plea Bargaining: Differential Subjective
Decision Making as an Engine of Racial Stratification in the United States Prison
System 3 (Ctr. for the Study of Econ. & Soc’y, Working Paper No. 52), available at
http://www.economyandsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/wp52_Savitsky_Plea
Bargaining.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
176
EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 5, at 104; Feeley, Pleading Guilty in Lower
Courts, supra note 168, at 464; David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features
of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255, 258 (1965). See
generally MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF
PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1981); NARDULLI, supra note 5.
177
PACKER, supra note 162, at 160–61.
178
Id. at 160.
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once the case comes to trial.179 The resulting criminal practices
are not, therefore, rooted in malice or trigger-happiness on the
part of prosecutors, but rather in an assumption that defendants
are guilty and securing their convictions is a priority.180 Alan
Dershowitz provides a simplified version of this practical modus
operandi, which he refers to as the “thirteen Rules of the
Criminal Justice Game”:
Rule I: Most criminal defendants are, in fact, guilty.
Rule II: All criminal defense lawyers, prosecutors and judges
understand and believe Rule I.
Rule III: It is easier to convict guilty defendants by violating
the Constitution than by complying with it, and in some cases it
is impossible to convict guilty defendants without violating the
Constitution.
Rule IV: Many police lie about whether they violated the
Constitution in order to convict guilty defendants.
Rule V: All prosecutors, judges and defense attorneys are
aware of Rule IV.
Rule VI: Many prosecutors implicitly encourage police to lie
about whether they violated the Constitution in order to convict
guilty defendants.
....
Rule XI: Most judges and prosecutors would not knowingly
convict a defendant who they believe to be innocent of the crime
charged (or a closely related crime).181

While Dershowitz’s rules are framed as practitioners’
impressions of the process, there is a body of social science
literature confirming the existence of a prosecutorial
organizational culture that adopts a presumption of guilt.182 The
adherence to a presumption of guilt is engrained in the history of
the prosecutorial role. The modern conception of a public officerprosecutor is fairly new; at the turn of the twentieth century, the
criminal justice process was still initiated by private citizen
complainants and mitigated merely by the discretion of

179

Id. at 160–61.
Id.
181
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, LETTERS TO A YOUNG LAWYER 80–81 (2001).
182
See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1621–22 (2006).
180
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magistrates and top police officers.183
The emergence of
independent office holders was a response to biased and corrupt
police practices, tied to contemporary concerns associated with
prohibition and gambling enforcement.184 However, upon the
establishment of a district attorney’s office, the new office holders
quickly adapted to the political landscape and positioned
themselves at the forefront of raiding and arrest activities,
expressing cynical views toward the subjects of those activities.185
This notion is so prevalent that it is widely affirmed by popular
culture, which constantly reminds us that the presumption of
innocence is widely regarded by prosecutors as legal fiction.186
What were the implications of this organizational culture for
discovery practices? In a 1994 survey of practitioners, the
nineteen prosecutor interviewees expressed mixed feelings about
the practice of broad discovery.187
The interviewees
acknowledged that having a broad practice of discovery
encouraged efficient proceedings regardless of the defendant’s
guilt, presumably because of the increased likelihood of reaching
a plea bargain.188 They expressed concerns, however, about
potential intimidation of victims or witnesses whose identities
would become known, as well as about the possibility of
compromising informants.189 Interviewees also had the general
sense that the discovery process was an unreciprocated “one-way
street” from prosecutors to defense attorneys. By providing the
defense with a broad range of information, “bad guys” were
allowed to beat the system.190 In an organizational culture that
183
Allen Steinberg, The “Lawman” in New York: William Travers Jerome and
the Origins of the Modern District Attorney in Turn-of-the-Century New York, 34 U.
TOL. L. REV. 753, 754 (2003).
184
Id. at 759–60.
185
Id. at 767.
186
Christine Alice Corcos, Prosecutors, Prejudices and Justice: Observations on
Presuming Innocence in Popular Culture and Law, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 793, 796
(2003). See generally Michael M. Epstein, For and Against the People: Television’s
Prosecutor Image and the Cultural Power of the Legal Profession, 34 U. TOL. L. REV.
817 (2003). Epstein highlights an important point. The representation of ‘good’
defense attorneys, such as Perry Mason, essentially aligns them with a prosecutorial
role: Mason acquits defendants on grounds of factual innocence while at the same
time implicating the real guilty party in the crime, affirming the commitment to
actual guilt. Id. at 827.
187
Middlekauff, supra note 97, at 15–16.
188
Id. at 17.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 16.
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believes in guilt, it is not difficult to see how this mentality
creates a tension between the wish to disclose enough
incriminating evidence to guarantee cooperation and incentivize
guilty pleas, while not disclosing information that might just help
a guilty defendant win an acquittal on what is perceived to be a
technicality.
This discussion prompts a different question:
What
generates the presumption of guilt in the first place, and how
does it impact Brady practices? For an answer, the next section
turns to social psychology literature and confirmation bias.
B.

Facts and Opinion: Insights from Cultural Cognition, Social
Psychology, and Studies of Prosecutorial Culture
Consider the following illustration:
FIG. 1

This optical illusion developed by Edgar Rubin demonstrates
how the same object can be seen in two mutually incompatible
ways: a vase or two profiles.191 Which shape the viewer perceives
depends on the way he or she resolves the figure-ground problem;
the viewer can see either shape, but not both.
Evidence in a criminal case in an adversarial system can be
conceptualized using the face-vase metaphor. Facts pertaining to
a case can be seen to support a conclusion of guilt or innocence,
depending on perspective. Granted, in some cases, such as when
DNA evidence is provided, one conclusion may be more salient

191
EDGAR RUBIN, SYNSOPLEVEDE FIGURER fig.3 (1915). For more on optical
illusions and their neurological explanation, see generally Uri Hasson et al., Vase or
Face? A Neural Correlate of Shape-Selective Grouping Processes in the Human
Brain, 13 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 744 (2001).
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than the other, and therefore more likely agreed upon.192 But
many pieces of evidence, including witness testimonies and even
defendant confessions, possess strengths and weaknesses and are
therefore open to interpretation. The premise of an adversarial
system is that both parties examine the same evidence and
provide the jury with conflicting perspectives regarding its
strength. But do the parties themselves see the evidence in
conflicting ways? Research on social psychology and cultural
cognition responds in the affirmative, and suggests that the
source of distortion is not a neurological issue but rather a
psychological phenomenon known as confirmation bias.
Confirmation bias is a mechanism that affects how we
interpret information.193 The theory behind the bias is that
humans do not approach new information with an entirely blank
mind. Rather, we perceive information through our alreadytainted perspective, complete with our prior opinions and biases.
We tend to be attached to our perception, and therefore seek
information that confirms our already-solidified perspective and
resist persuasion to the contrary.194
Studies conducted by cultural cognition scholars consistently
find confirmation bias operating in legal and political matters.195
In survey experiments, subjects consistently view not only
opinions, but facts and hard evidence, through the prism of their
political and social worldviews.196 One such study examined

192
In some cases, the very fact that the evidence is “scientific” lends it more
credibility as conducive to a conclusion of guilt, a phenomenon known as the “CSI
Effect.” See, e.g., Arun Rath, Is the “CSI Effect” Influencing Courtrooms?, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/06/133497696/is-the-csi-effectinfluencing-courtrooms; see also Donald E. Shelton, The “CSI Effect”: Does It Really
Exist?, 259 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 1 (Mar. 2008), available at http://nij.gov/nij/journals/
259/csi-effect.htm (reporting a survey indicating that viewers of CSI were likely to
have a higher standard for scientific evidence and to expect scientific evidence, but
suggesting that those expectations may be rationally related to the types of cases
that are likely to include such evidence).
193
Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The
Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098 (1979).
194
JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 195–96 (4th ed. 2008).
195
For information on the cultural cognition project at Yale University, see
LAW
SCH.,
THE
CULTURAL
COGNITION
PROJECT,
generally
YALE
http://www.culturalcognition.net/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
196
See e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott v.
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 867, 870
(2009).
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public perceptions using Scott v. Harris197 as a case study. Scott
was a § 1983 lawsuit arguing that a police chase caused an
accident that left the plaintiff permanently disabled.198 In
reversing the district court decision, Justice Scalia referred to a
police video introduced as evidence, arguing that the video
clearly showed that the plaintiff endangered the public and the
police, thus justifying the police chase.199 Seeking to question the
assumption that any possible reasonable juror would perceive the
evidence in the same way, the researchers presented a thousand
respondents with the video and asked them whether the plaintiff
had in fact posed the kind of danger that justified the chase.200
The findings cast doubt on Justice Scalia’s assumption that the
video would “speak for itself.”201 While most subjects agreed that
the plaintiff posed some risk, there was disagreement not only
regarding the normative question whether the police chase was
justified but also regarding the degree of danger posed by the
plaintiff.202 The subjects’ varied opinions correlated with their
worldviews.203
Subjects with a hierarchical—conservative,
individualistic,
free-market-oriented—worldview
were
significantly more likely to perceive Harris’ driving as more
dangerous than subjects subscribing to an egalitarian—
progressive, communitarian, welfarist—worldview.204
In a similar study, subjects were presented with a
hypothetical
acquaintance-rape
scenario
based
on
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz205 and were randomly assigned
They were asked to
different legal definitions of rape.206
comment on the extent of their agreement with a series of factual
statements—for example, whether the victim consented; whether
the perpetrator believed that the victim had consented—as well
197

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
Id. at 374–76.
199
Id. at 378 n.5 (providing a URL for the video and stating that the Court was
happy “to allow the videotape to speak for itself”).
200
Kahan et al., supra note 196, at 854–57.
201
Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 n.5.
202
Kahan et al., supra note 196, at 865–66 & figs. 2–4.
203
Id. at 867.
204
Id. at 879 (noting the distinction between hierarchical and egalitarian
worldviews as used in other cultural cognition literature).
205
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
206
Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and
Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 767 (2010).
198
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as with legal conclusions—for example, the perpetrator should be
found guilty of rape.207 The main finding was that the subjects’
worldviews, rather than legal definitions, were the determining
factor in establishing whether the defendant understood the
victim to have consented to intercourse.208
Subjects with
hierarchical, individualistic worldviews tended to infer consent
significantly more readily than subjects with egalitarian,
communitarian perspectives.209
This difference was found
particularly between hierarchical and egalitarian female
subjects.210 Interestingly, the legal definitions did not make any
significant difference in the inferences made by subjects
regarding either facts or law.211
Cultural cognition studies identify confirmation bias as a
function of worldview. But can confirmation bias be generated by
a mere prompt for a partisan position? Apparently, in some
situations, yes. Perhaps the most famous illustration of roleinduced perception of reality is the Stanford prison experiment,
in which participants were randomly assigned the roles of
inmates and guards.212 Both groups had thoroughly internalized
their roles, to the point that “guard” cruelty and “inmate”
anguish led to ending the study prematurely.213 But conditioning
does not have to be so extreme to yield confirmation bias. In a
study by Dan Simon, Douglas M. Stenstrom, and Stephen J.
Read, respondents were presented with the facts of a plagiarism
incident at a university.214 Respondents were randomly assigned
roles as independent evaluators, counsel for the university, and
counsel for the charged student. The respondents’ assessment of
the facts and the strength of the evidence varied significantly
based on the role they were assigned to occupy.215

207

Id. at 771.
Id. at 793.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 794.
211
Id. at 795.
212
Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 INT’L J.
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 69 (1973).
213
Id. at 81.
214
Dan Simon et al., Adversarial and Non-Adversarial Investigations: An
Experiment 2, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1401723 (last revised Oct. 25, 2009).
215
Id. at 10.
208
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If a person’s perception of the strength of evidence in a given
case can vary so dramatically based on a mere prompt to be
partisan, there is much more reason to assume such partiality on
the part of professionals who spend months and years in an
organizational culture encouraging certain views and
discouraging others. In a 1963 law review article, Justice
Brennan expressed his dismay with a prosecutorial perspective
that perceives the criminal process as a “sporting contest,” the
creation of which attitude he ascribed to the adversarial
process.216 Ethnographical research done on prosecutorial and
defense offices confirms that, while both parties are engaged in
an effort to assess the strength of the evidence, their foci differ:
Prosecutors assess whether their case is “convictable,”217 and
defense attorneys assess the value of their case for acquittal.218
Confirmation bias influences prosecutors and defense
attorneys not only with respect to the evidence, but also with
respect to the issue of discovery itself.
In a survey of
practitioners regarding discovery, prosecutors and defense
attorneys disagreed over whether discovery proceedings caused
undue delay in the progress of a case.219 Moreover, when asked
to report on the risks stemming from improper discovery
practices, prosecutors tended to highlight the concern that
overbroad discovery would provide defendants with information
leading to witness intimidation,220 whereas defense attorneys
tended to be concerned that lack of proper discovery might yield
wrongful convictions.221

216
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest
for Truth? 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 279. Ironically, an inquisitorial system, in which
the jury is not presented with two versions of the truth but just with one, raises the
concern that the jury might develop a confirmation bias as well and identify with the
one position that is offered. Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions: Adversarial and
Inquisitorial Themes, 35 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 387, 391, 401–02, 421 (2010).
217
Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race,
Class, and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
531, 541–42 (1997) (discussing the challenge in a segregated society of convincing
jurors to empathize with a victim of color whose class and life experience may be
quite unfamiliar to a white middle-class jury).
218
Emmelman, supra note 92, at 336.
219
Middlekauff, supra note 97, at 17.
220
Id. at 18.
221
Id. at 54. Interestingly, the judges surveyed were split on the matter. Id. at
19.
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The above examples suggest, of course, that the problem of
confirmation bias is not limited to prosecutors.
Defense
attorneys, too, perceive evidence through a biased lens. There is
greater reason to worry, however, about confirmation bias in the
prosecutorial context. Not only are prosecutors entrusted with
the public interest, rather than with the zealous, partisan
representation of a specific client;222 they are also in control of the
investigatory apparatus.223 The list of disastrous consequences of
“tunnel vision” for police officers and prosecutors is topped by the
possibility of wrongful convictions.224
V.

A COMMENT ON CONFIRMATION BIAS AND INTENT

The discussion above explains why ignoring the insidious
effects of confirmation bias can lead to serious miscarriages of
justice when prosecutorial intent to produce the miscarriage
cannot be proven. This could lead to the belief that, when actual
intent can be proven, there is no problem. However, the facts in
Connick highlight another ironic consequence of intent-based
rules: Sometimes, it is precisely the positive finding of intent
that prevents us from remedying prosecutorial wrongs. Recall
the facts in Connick: Justice Thomas’ opinion of the Court, as
well as Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion, did not fail to find
intent. Indeed, Deegan, the prosecutor who had originally
handled the case, was not only aware of the existence of the blood
test and of his failure to disclose it to the defense, but also
plagued with guilt over this failure, which accompanied him to
his deathbed.225 Ironically, Deegan’s “guilty knowledge” of his
misconduct was interpreted by both Justices as an outlier: His

222
Levine & Feeley, supra note 3. Further many prosecutors resent having to
take on victim representation roles. Kay L. Levine, Can Prosecutors Be Social
Workers?, (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 05-41), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=
869433.
223
John L. Worrall, Prosecution in America: A Historical and Comparative
Account, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 1, 15–16 (John L.
Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008).
224
ANTONIO LAMER, THE LAMER COMMISSION OF INQUIRY PERTAINING TO THE
CASES OF: RONALD DALTON, GREGORY PARSONS AND RANDY DRUKEN 71–72 (2006),
available at http://www.justice.gov.nl.ca/just/publications/lamercontents.pdf; Roach,
supra note 216, at 391.
225
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 n.1 (2011).
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intentional Brady violation highlighted the other prosecutors’
lack of intent, and, as a consequence, his individualized failure
negated the possibility of an institutional failure.
The Court’s reluctance to ascribe Deegan’s personal failure
to a broader institutional culture could be seen as the general
tendency of legal settings to distinguish between the individual
and aggregate levels of analysis,226 but it could also be read as
another example of the judicial tendency to view law enforcement
actions as benign. Good faith mistakes made by police officers,
even those that suggest underlying systemic problems, preclude
the exclusion of evidence.227 The recent decision in Herring v.
United States goes as far as to absolve police officers of guilt for
mistakes made by other police departments, as long as those are
merely negligent, not malicious or reckless.228 In Connick, as in
Herring, one actor’s guilt ironically acted to absolve another actor
and to satisfy ourselves with a narrow basis for personal
accountability in lieu of broader institutional accountability.
In the Brady context, culpability becomes an issue not just
through an explicit requirement to find intent but also as a side
issue when analyzing issues such as causation and prejudice.229
These nebulous situations make it even more problematic to tie
prosecutorial misconduct to harm suffered by the defendant.
Short of finding individual malice, it is very difficult to prove that
departmental misconduct caused a particular harm.
The

226
The best example of this trend, in a completely different context, is
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (declining to overturn petitioner’s
capital sentence on the basis of statistical data showing disparate sentencing by
Georgia capital juries based on the race of defendant and victim). The dissent in
McCleskey pointed out that previous decisions by the Court held that “a death
sentence must be struck down when the circumstances under which it has been
imposed ‘creat[e] an unacceptable risk that the death penalty [may have been] meted
out arbitrarily or capriciously or through whim or mistake.’ ” Id. at 323 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 343 (1985)).
227
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (“In the absence of an
allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression
is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their
affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence
of probable cause.”).
228
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). For more on the impact of
fragmented policing on the allocation of guilt in police practices, see Aviram et al.,
supra note 148, at 715.
229
Bennett L. Gershman, Mental Culpability and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 26
AM. J. CRIM. L. 121, 127 (1998).
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personal-institutional dichotomy encouraged by such intentbased rules ignores the realities of confirmation bias and its
origins: The same hyperadversarial culture is at the root of both
intentional,
malicious
misbehavior
and
run-of-the-mill
confirmation bias problems. The focus on the former makes the
latter, which might be much more frequent, recede to the
background.
Focusing on intentional miscarriages of justice at the
expense of broader institutional problems misses the point that
the dangers of unintentional or invidious discrimination lie in the
very fact that it is unintentional. As such, it is hidden from view
and from critique. Even if, as some argue, prosecutorial intent is
always relevant in assessing conduct,230 the potential for
miscarriage of justice due to systemic or organizational flaws
requires broadening our view of causality at least when awarding
compensation for exonerees. In that respect, the effects of tunnel
vision and confirmation bias are no different in the Brady context
than they are in the contexts of police profiling, reliance on faulty
evidence or search warrants, prosecutorial behavior during voir
dire, or any other law enforcement blunder.
VI. SOLUTIONS
One potential cynical reaction to my rejection of intent or
bad faith as a helpful standard in assessing prosecutorial
fallacies is that blaming a vague “prosecutorial culture” for
miscarriages of justice fails to place the blame squarely upon
deserving shoulders, and therefore fails to create proper
incentives for ethical behavior. Moreover, ascribing all such
miscarriages of justice to confirmation bias would seem to
suggest that no viable solution exists. This Part refutes these
claims by suggesting that prosecutorial misconduct can, and
should, be recognized on different levels. Section 1983 suits are a
particularly unproductive way of handling such situations. A
proper, holistic approach to the problem should combine
uncompromising disciplinary procedures against particular office
holders who displayed bad faith, coupled with fundamental
rethinking of the systemic features that encourage
hyperadversarialism, confirmation bias, and adversarial
hostilities.
230

Id. at 133.
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Discussions about the efficacy of remedies in the criminal
context have most often revolved around the exclusionary rule
and its deterrent function vis-à-vis the police.231 While some
have considered personal sanctions against police officers to be of
importance, the consensus seems to be that they are not
sufficient as a remedy.232 In order to make proceedings against
prosecutors more effective, they need to include publicizing the
offending prosecutor’s record,233 as well as downstream
consequences in terms of case allocation234 and implications for
promotion.235
Making the government “pay” in a case outcome is also
unsatisfactory in the prosecutorial context. The exclusionary
rule has been regarded as an effective deterrent against police
excess in both case law and empirical scholarship.236 However, it
does not have a direct equivalent in cases of prosecutorial
discovery failures. The only equivalent is a well-publicized
acquittal or exoneration, which does not have a similar effect
given the rare frequency of its occurrence.237 Moreover, the
exonerative outcome of a single high-profile, post-conviction
proceeding, even if the facts of the case expose us to particularly
unsavory manifestations of prosecutorial conduct, does little in
the way of consistent monitoring for such practices in the vast
majority of criminal cases, which are resolved through plea
bargaining, or, less commonly, in low-profile trials. As Maximo
Langer points out in his analysis of prosecutorial adjudication,
“Nondisclosure of evidence favorable to the defense hinders a
central mechanism to check that prosecutors do not make plea

231
See Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court
Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933, 990, 998 (2010).
232
Matthew V. Hess, Comment, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal
Remedies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149, 184.
233
Gier, supra note 153, at 205–06.
234
Id. at 208.
235
See id. at 208–10.
236
WALKER, supra note 152.
237
BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 231 (2011). According to the Innocence Project, as of the
writing of this Article, 311 individuals have been exonerated by DNA evidence.
Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCEPROJECT.ORG, http://www.innocence
project.org/know/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
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proposals in weak cases.”238 It is this bulk of unknown cases that
requires solutions that go beyond disciplinary steps against a
specific malicious or reckless prosecutor.
The suggested solutions to prosecutorial discovery oversights
are, therefore, broader and more systematic.
This Article
suggests adopting intent-neutral compensation statutes for
exonerees in all states, thereby divorcing the question of
compensation from the question of prosecutorial mens rea. Given
the questionable efficacy of alleviating confirmation bias with
training in Brady doctrine, this Article suggests reforming hiring
practices at prosecutorial offices so as to favor potential
prosecutors who have done defense work in the past, and
initiating a practice of a “devil’s advocate” case reader who would
examine a given case from a defense perspective. Similarly,
while drilling Brady doctrine into law students and bar takers
would do little to prepare them to combat confirmation biases in
practice, law school exams and bar essays can be structured in a
way that encourages lawyers to view facts from multiple
perspectives.
A.

Compensation Scheme for Exonerees

Currently, only twenty-two states, the District of Columbia,
and the federal government have compensation statutes for
wrongful imprisonment.239
Other states rely on special
legislation or, more frequently, on exoneree-initiated § 1983
lawsuits.240 If one accepts the premise that miscarriages of
justice by the prosecution can occur as the result of
organizational culture and confirmation bias, and that even
incidents of individual malice thrive in prosecutorial Petri-dishes
of
overzealousness
and
hyperadversarialism,
divorcing

238

Langer, supra note 4, at 272.
Jessica R. Lonergan, Protecting the Innocent: A Model for Comprehensive,
Individualized Compensation of the Exonerated, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
405, 409 (2008); see also Shawn Armbrust, Note, When Money Isn’t Enough: The
Case for Holistic Compensation of the Wrongfully Convicted, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
157, 167–68 (2004) (explaining that compensation regimes differ dramatically
among states and various proposals are being considered for improving the
mechanism). A thorough discussion of these systems exceeds the framework of this
Article; the point is merely that guilt-based compensation is inadequate.
240
For more on the inadequacy of the latter two systems, and the clear
preference of the former, see generally Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails:
Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73 (1999).
239
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culpability for wrongful convictions from a finding of
prosecutorial bad faith is the natural conclusion. The material
question is what purpose the compensation serves. In cases of
exonerees, who spend an average of fourteen years in prison for
crimes they did not commit,241 the main goal is to help the
exoneree rebuild his or her life and to try to make up—to the
extent that money can adequately do so—for the lost years of
health, employment, education, living situation, and personal
growth. Given this goal, the reason for the wrongful conviction is
immaterial. Does it really matter, for purposes of restitution or
compensation, whether the years of unjust imprisonment are the
product of malice, recklessness, lack of training, or confirmation
bias originating from prosecutorial organizational culture?
“[W]hen the exercise of state power results in an erroneous
confinement, the government whose police power made such
confinement possible should to the extent feasible redress the
victim’s injury, regardless of whether any government agent has
played a culpable role.”242
Relying on statutory compensation does present a few
challenges. One argument is that large expenditures on exoneree
compensation may present difficulties to legislators who cannot
budget for it,243 but such an argument can be countered by
Another hurdle might be the
creating a statutory cap.244
definition of exoneration; many cases, in which guilt has been
seriously questioned, including by DNA evidence, do not end in a
formal exoneration but rather in a plea bargain.245 A hearing
241

GARRETT, supra note 237, at 180.
Joseph H. King, Jr., Comment, Compensation of Persons Erroneously
Confined by the State, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1970). This notion also avoids
the need to engage in calculations of comparative fault, which seem to completely
miss the point by comparing a § 1983 lawsuit to an action in torts and especially
have the potential for confounding the exoneree with his or her incompetent
attorney. For the opposite position, expressed rather cynically, see Adam I. Kaplan,
Comment, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully
Convicted, 56 UCLA L. REV. 227, 244–46 (2008). Comparative fault would, of course,
not be necessary in a non-fault-based compensation system.
243
Michael Higgins, Tough Luck for the Innocent Man, 85 A.B.A. J. 46, 51–52
(1999).
244
Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket? A Model Statute for
Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 665, 705 (2002).
245
Armbrust, supra note 239, at 171 n.110. Recently, Damien Echols, Jason
Baldwin, and Jessie Misskelley were released from prison on an Alford plea after
serving eighteen years—Echols on death row—for murders that DNA evidence
strongly suggests they did not commit. Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West
242
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before a disinterested factfinder for the purpose of determining
compensation may open the door for compensating in such
cases.246 Finally, there is the potential argument that no-fault
compensation fails to deter prosecutors from unethical behavior.
The above discussion of confirmation bias, which ascribes far
more incidents of miscarriage of justice to a hyperadversarial
organizational culture than to deliberate malice, suggests
otherwise.
While compensation might be an incentive for
preventing malfeasance in the future, it also serves an
independent goal: helping exonerees overcome deep past
deprivation. In order to achieve the latter, compensation should
be prospective, rather than retrospective, and should focus on
helping exonerees rebuild their lives, rather than on quibbling
about questions of fault.247
B.

Prosecutorial Hiring Practices and “Devil’s Advocate”
Positions

The findings regarding confirmation bias cast doubt on the
possibility of changing prosecutorial culture by training alone.
There are, however, two other avenues to consider that might
have greater impact on the way evidence is interpreted in
prosecutorial offices: a change in priorities in hiring for
prosecutorial positions and a different distribution of labor in the
workplace.
The suggested strategy regarding hiring is to create a
preference for prosecutors who have been previously employed as
public or private defense attorneys. While such practices will not
eliminate socialization to the new office culture, they will at least
provide the office with personnel who are experienced in
examining evidence with a skeptical eye. Given that, as late as
the 1970s, most prosecutors in the United States also had a
private practice in which they did defense work,248 this is a much
milder proposal than it might seem.

Memphis Three’ in Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/us/20arkansas.html.
246
Armbrust, supra note 239, at 171.
247
This also means compensation should be more than monetary and should
include help and support in housing, employment, and education. Id. at 160.
248
Joy, supra note 161, at 409 n.49; see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 8.9.4 (1986).
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With regard to workplace practices, it would be sensible to
place responsibility for training on the shoulders of those who
have had both prosecutorial and defense experience. Some also
suggest assigning a particular prosecutor as “devil’s advocate”
and requiring that cases be read skeptically by someone who is
not personally invested in the case and who would be able to
challenge the prosecutorial perspective on the facts.249 This
proposal, made generally in the context of prosecutorial
misconduct, is particularly important in the context of discovery
failures.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind the high percentage
of cases in which discovery is an informal process occurring
between the parties with no judicial involvement. It is possible
that if the judiciary were required to take a more active role in
discovery proceedings, as it does semi-formally in the context of
plea bargains,250 fewer discovery failures and omissions would
occur.251
C.

Law School Pedagogy and Bar Testing

The final group of solutions pertains directly to the issue in
Connick: the prospect of improving discovery proceedings
through proper training in law schools. The discussion above
clearly casts heavy doubt on the ability to create change through
teaching of the black-letter Brady doctrine in law school.
Knowing the rule that requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence
is unlikely to make young prosecutors actually assess evidence
differently in the field. However, there are some pedagogical
steps that can be taken to help combat confirmation bias. First,
an increasing percentage of law school education is conducted in
clinical settings,252 and research shows the immense effect of law

249
Bruce MacFarlane, Convicting the Innocent: A Triple Failure of the Justice
System, 31 MANITOBA L.J. 403, 443 (2006).
250
FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
251
Tempering prosecutorial zeal through judicial review is recommended in
other contexts of criminal trial. Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics
Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies over the Anti-Contact and
Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 348–49 (1992).
252
The Carnegie report has encouraged law schools to incorporate more clinical
education in the law school curriculum. See generally WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL.,
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 115 (2007).
Clinical education has also proven to be beneficial in improving students’ reasoning.
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office work by students on their professional values.253 Being
under the tutelage of unethical supervisors in criminal practice
clinics is unhealthy and the potential long-term damage to the
formation of proper professional instincts and ethics requires
that clinical settings be carefully monitored. In crafting the
academic component of a clinical program, it is important to
regard the ability to see a given scenario from different
perspectives as an essential lawyerly skill, to the extent that it is
not regarded as such now.254 Second, law schools might want to
consider requiring that students in criminal clinic placements
spend time in each of the two offices. Since ideological alliances
are formed fairly early on in the educational process, it is
advisable for students to keep an open mind and strive to
experience the system from multiple perspectives before seeking
a permanent position as a lawyer.255
Finally, some changes to law school and bar exam structure
might indirectly address confirmation bias and encourage
flexibility of perspective. Bar exams have been criticized for
testing rote memorization of legal doctrine and applying it to
artificial settings.256 Granted, the bar exam itself cannot be
expected to be an educational tool of quality, and it is designed to

Stefan H. Krieger, The Effect of Clinical Education on Law Student Reasoning: An
Empirical Study, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 359, 383–84 (2008).
253
Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effects of Law Office Work on the Formation of
Law Students’ Professional Values: Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 543–44 (1991).
254
Norman Redlich, Lawyer Skills Can Be Taught, 3 LEARNING & L. 10, 12
(1976).
255
This point was driven home to me rather forcefully when I conducted an inclass experiment at Hastings, replicating Dan Kahan, Dave Hoffman, and Don
Braman’s experiment on Scott v. Harris. The students, who had participated in the
criminal practice clinic prior to taking the seminar, were asked to watch the video
and comment on Harris’ driving and on the justifiability of police action during the
car chase. I threw in a demographic variable regarding former clinical practices.
Students who had externed in prosecutorial offices tended to assess Harris’ conduct
as more dangerous than students who had externed in defense offices. While the
numbers of students were too small to conduct significance tests, the anecdotal
evidence might suggest one of two things: either the students were socialized into
perceiving reality as prosecutors or defense attorneys during their semester at the
clinic, or they had self-selected the party with which they interned based on their
prior worldviews and ideologies. Either way, this suggests the need to balance out
such tendencies with a more comprehensive placement policy.
256
Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers, Society of American Law Teachers Statement on
the Bar Exam, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 446, 447 (2002).
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only test basic skills;257 the questions must have a clear answer to
be easily and properly graded, and it would be difficult to
construct questions with shades of gray in them. Nonetheless,
essay questions, and particularly performance tests, can easily be
crafted in a way that requires bar takers to assess a given
scenario from the perspective of one party and then take on the
same scenario from the perspective of the opposite party. This is
a particularly attractive choice with regard to performance tests,
which require the application of problem-solving skills to a given
set of materials and often involve writing a persuasive memo or
other legal document.258 Similarly, law school exams, which
allow for more ambiguity, could also be structured in a way that
would require students to address the same issue from two
polarized perspectives and provide persuasive arguments for
each.
EPILOGUE: AGENDA FOR A FUTURE STUDY
While this Article draws on rich experimental literature
regarding confirmation bias and cultural cognition of prosecutors,
the specific impact of these phenomena on prosecutorial fact
perception, while plausible, has not been experimentally tested
yet. The discussion here sets the stage for a future experimental
study that will expose prosecutors and defense attorneys to
criminal cases with evidentiary materials, to test their
assessment of the inculpatory or exculpatory potential value of
the evidence. Such a study will randomly assign all participants,
regardless of their institutional affiliation or identity, one of
three positions: partisanship for either the prosecution or the
defense or impartiality. The study will control for the length of
time spent at the position, as well as for previous positions
litigating for the opposite side. The study should also include
groups of law students who hope to practice as prosecutors or

257

Suzanne Darrow-Kleinhaus, A Response to the Society of American Law
Teachers Statement on the Bar Exam, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 442, 444 (2004).
258
See, e.g., California Bar Exam Instructions, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
http://www.calbarxap.com/applications/CalBar/info/bar_exam.html (last visited Nov.
9, 2013). The current format of the California Bar Exam requires applicants to
complete, among other things, two “performance tests,” in which applicants are
provided with a “case file” and a “library” of legal resources, from which applicants
must complete a legal brief, memo, or other such document within the time period
provided. Id.
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defense attorneys, before and after spending time in
prosecutorial and defense offices, thus enabling us to
differentiate between the effects of personal self-selection and
organizational culture. It is hoped that the study’s results will
either support or undermine the confirmation bias theory, thus
allowing scholars to understand better why Brady mishaps occur,
why the legal fault-based standard barely skims the surface of
organizational partisanship, and how the criminal process can be
better structured, free of hyperadversarial tension and conducive
to truthful fact-finding.

